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Abstract
The paper investigates credibility of the intermediarys advice in a
bilateral trade model. A seller and a buyer with private and indepen-
dent uniformly distributed valuations exchange a unit of good. Their
trade is mediated by an intermediary, who at the pre-bargaining stage
observes a coarse signal about the buyers valuation and reveals some
information to the seller. We rst show that if the broker gets a xed
fee for each executed transaction, he can transmit his information
credibly via cheap talk. Full information revelation can be sustained
even when the intermediarys information about the buyer becomes
arbitrarily precise. The transmission of information by the broker in-
creases ex ante welfare of the seller and the broker, but has ambiguous
impact on the buyer. If the intermediary observes signals about valu-
ations of both participants, the fully revealing equilibrium exists only
under certain restrictions on parameters of the model. Another limit
to e¢ cient communication can be imposed by competition between in-
termediaries. We then consider the mechanism design problem for an
informed intermediary, and prove that choosing an appropriate system
of two-part tari¤s allows the intermediary to secure the same payo¤
as in the optimal direct mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Bilateral bargaining often takes place under asymmetric information. The
parties may seek better information about the other side trying to improve
their bargaining positions. Natural sources of such information are inter-
mediaries that in many cases implement the transactions. Indeed, a large
fraction of real estate transactions are mediated by realtors, most IPOs are
mediated by investment banks and art sales are often mediated by specialized
dealers, etc. These intermediaries often have superior information about the
demand for (or the supply of) the item being sold, and, sometimes, about
the private valuation of a particular buyer or seller.
The informed intermediaries may and do a¤ect the outcomes of the bar-
gaining if they reveal their information in the form of advice. In case of art
auctions, auction house experts help sellers to set reserve prices and at the
same time provide in the pre-auction catalogues a low and a high price esti-
mate for each item, which may signal the sellers secret reserve price1. In the
real estate sector the Federal Trade Commission survey reports that 20.9%
of buyers and 30.5% of sellers use the real estate agents advice as the sin-
gle most inuential source of information to determine their rst price o¤ers
and listing prices, respectively. Despite an apparent conict of interests, the
intermediaries may even advise both sides in the bargaining.
While the consumers welcome the intermediariesadvice, they are also
concerned about the abuse of the private information by the broker. For
example, there was a serious debate on whether the nancial institutions
should be allowed to act as realtors. In December 2000 the Federal Reserve
and Treasury Department issued a joint proposal which would allow nancial
holding companies (FHCs) and nancial subsidiaries of national banks to
engage in the real estate brokerage. This proposal met a large discontent of
the realtors, and one of the concerns was the endangered consumer privacy.
The National Association of Realtors (NAR) reports that 81% of Americans
1The sellers secret reserve price, by convention, lies below the low estimate (Ashenfelter
and Graddy (2002))
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are worried that their bank could use their private information to sell real
estate services to them.2 NARs report further argues that FHC-operated
real estate brokerage operations could have access to seller-client nancial
records and use that private credit information to the detriment of a home-
seller....
Whether intermediariesadvice about other party of potential transaction
can be trusted, who gains and who loses from the intermediarys ability to
consult his clients, what is its overall e¤ect on the welfare these questions,
by no means obvious, will be addressed in this paper. While the role of
intermediaries in facilitating bargaining is vastly discussed in the literature,3
there are relatively few papers that investigate information transmission by
intermediaries.
Biglaiser (1993) shows that the presence of a middleman, who detects a
goods true quality, increases e¢ ciency in a market plagued by adverse se-
lection. One important idea is that a middleman, being a long-lived player,
attaches high value to his reputation which prevents him from cheating his
customers. Another idea is that being a large player, a middleman has higher
incentives to invest in appraising skills. In a similar vein, Dixit (2003) ex-
amines provision of information by intermediaries in a dynamic context; the
credibility in his model is also reputation-based. Dixits model deals with
ine¢ ciencies due to moral hazard, rather than adverse selection: the inter-
mediary informs its clients about past behavior of their trading partners.
Another strand of related literature investigates intermediaries who pro-
vide certication services. Lizzeri (1999) shows that a monopolistic certica-
2The National Association of Realtors (2001).
3Typically, intermediaries have access to some information technology that helps bring-
ing two parties together and thus raises the e¢ ciency of the market organization (Rubin-
stein and Wolinsky (1987), Yavas (1994), Gehrig (1993)). For instance, Gehrig (1993)
considers a search model in which a continuum of buyers and sellers privately informed
about their valuations engage in bilateral trade once they meet. In this context an inter-
mediary can reduce the trading frictions in two ways: provide more e¢ cient matching and,
by committing to xed buy and sell prices, replace the ine¢ cient bilateral bargaining.
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tion intermediary discloses only minimal information consistent with e¢ cient
trade, while appropriating a large share of total surplus. However, Lizzeri
does not explore incentives of the intermediary to provide the information
truthfully he assumes that the certier can commit to any disclosure rule.
Strausz (2005) investigates the possibility of capture of the certier by pro-
ducers whose products he must appraise. Honest certication is sustainable
only if the discount factor which determines relative weights of short run and
long run prots is high enough. In this case the certier, willing to stay for
a long time at the market, cares about his reputation and does not falsify
his reports. The possibility of collusion of intermediary with a seller whose
products he certies is also investigated in Peyrache and Quesada (2007).
All the papers mentioned above are dynamic, while we investigate whether
an intermediarys credibility can be ensured in a static context. There are
circumstances in which a static framework may be more appropriate. First,
interactions between an intermediary and his clients can be one-shot. Then,
since advice given to previous clients is usually not observed by a new client,
and its quality is di¢ cult to estimate, reputation-based mechanisms of en-
suring credibility may not be very e¤ective.
Information transmission by intermediaries is studied from a somewhat
di¤erent angle in Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982), who in-
vestigate the optimal contracts between an issuer and an investment bank
which provides advising and distribution services, assuming that the invest-
ment banker is better informed about the capital market than the issuer is.
Although these papers investigate an intermediarys information services in
a static context as we do, the mechanisms ensuring credibility are quite dif-
ferent. First, the issuer, who purchases the information services from the
investment banker, designs the contract which species intermediarys com-
pensation as a function of his report. Second, the intermediary is directly
engaged in selling the issue. Therefore, there is a moral hazard dimension
which is not discussed in our paper: the banker may underprice the securities
to reduce his e¤orts necessary for distribution of the issue. Third, Baron
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and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982) assume one-sided asymmetric in-
formation: only the intermediary has private information about demand for
the issue. In our paper the intermediarys client also possesses private in-
formation and this fact plays a key role in sustaining truthful information
revelation by the intermediary. This assumption is often realistic. In many
circumstances, the seller (issuer) has some important characteristics unob-
servable by the intermediary but a¤ecting the sellers reaction to the inter-
mediarys advice: while a low-cost seller may decrease a price upon learning
about unfavorable demand, a high-cost seller may simply withdraw from the
market. In this paper we show, in particular, that inability to perfectly pre-
dict the sellers behavior creates for the intermediary incentives to truthfully
transmit information.
More precisely, we look at how the intermediary can improve e¢ ciency of
bilateral trade. As it is well known from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983),
bilateral trade with two-sided asymmetric information is inherently ine¢ -
cient. We introduce in a basic double-auction model of bilateral trade an
intermediary, who has access to some coarse information about one of the
parties (say, the buyer). The intermediary can facilitate trade by transmit-
ting this information to the other party at the pre-bargaining stage, thus
reducing information asymmetry. First, in Section 3, we assume that the
contract between the intermediary and the traders is xed exogenously: it
consists of a xed per-transaction fee. We show that in this setting the in-
termediary is able to credibly transmit the information he observes by cheap
talk;4 at the double-auction stage the traders play (piecewise) linear strate-
4Farrell and Gibbons (1989) were the rst to show that cheap talk can matter in bar-
gaining. Similar to our setup, in their model parties may announce at the pre-bargaining
stage whether they are keenor not keento trade. If saying that one is keenmakes
ones partner more likely to negotiate, then it is the keenest types (high-value buyers,
low-value sellers) who are most willing to say so, and hence cheap talk conveys some
meaningful information. Compared to the case without cheap talk, the equilibrium of the
modied bargaining game involves more trade when one of the parties has a keen type, and
less trade when both parties have intermediate types. See also Mathews and Postlewaite
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gies that generalize those derived in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). In our
set-up the intermediary may be tempted to understate his signal about the
buyers willingness trade: given that his messages are expected to be truth-
ful, this lie would induce the seller to bid less aggressively thus increasing
the probability of trade. However, if participation in bargaining is associated
with some (innitesimal) costs, sellers with high enough valuation would be
dissuaded from participation in bargaining by a pessimistic message about
the buyers valuation. It is this decrease in participation that deters the in-
termediary from lying. This mechanism of ensuring credibility plays a key
role in our paper and di¤erentiates it from other literature about information
transmission by intermediaries.
Moreover, we show that truthful communication can be achieved even if
the intermediarys information is arbitrarily precise  in a seeming contra-
diction to Crawford and Sobel (1982) who derive limits for the amount
of information that can be transmitted given a certain degree of conict of
interests. The fact that the advisee the seller possesses in our model pri-
vate information plays crucial role in explaining this disparity between our
results and those of Crawford and Sobel. Relatedly, Seidmann (1990) shows,
in a di¤erent context, that the receivers possession of private information
may ensure arbitrarily precise communication.
We explore welfare consequences of the intermediarys access to coarse
information about the buyers willingness to trade and ability to transmit this
information to the seller. We show that the probability of trade increases, as
well as the aggregate welfare; so does intermediarys own prot as well as the
seller expected utility. The impact on the buyer is two-fold: buyers who are
not eager to trade gain from increased probability of trade, while buyers with
high willingness to trade lose since the seller starts playing more aggressively
against them. The ex ante welfare of the buyer can either increase or decrease,
depending on the parameters.
In Section 4 we explore some limits to e¤ective communication. One limit
(1989).
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is posed by the intermediarys access to some information about both traders.
Then, his better knowledge of the sellers reaction on his report about the
buyers willingness to trade may give the intermediary incentives to under-
state the buyers eagerness to trade. Truthtelling equilibrium exists now only
under some restrictions on parameters. Another limit to e¤ective communi-
cation may be imposed by competition between intermediaries. We consider
a stylized model in which two intermediaries, each having one "captured"
buyer compete for one seller. Now, in contrast to the previous analysis, the
intermediary can be tempted to overstate his buyers willingness to trade in
order to attract the seller. Again, we show that fully revealing equilibria are
possible, but only under some restrictions on parameters.
In Section 5 we study a more general problem of designing an optimal
trading mechanism by a (partially) informed intermediary (in the same set-
up).5 We rst show that in an optimal direct mechanism the intermediary
gets the same payo¤ he would get were his information about the buyer
public. We then get back to the decentralized model. The intermediary now
o¤ers two-part tari¤s to the buyer and the seller, consisting of a participation
and a per-transaction fees. The traders then bargain via a double auction
mechanism, in which trade happens if the spread between the bids exceeds
the per-transaction fee set up by the broker. We show that there exists
a separating equilibrium in which the broker selects di¤erent contracts for
di¤erent signals he observes, and at the double-auction stage the traders play
(piecewise) linear strategies. The intermediarys expected prot achieves
the upper bound derived via the optimal direct mechanism. The optimal
contract species a higher transaction fee when the buyer is eager to trade,
as well as a (weakly) higher participation fee. Again, comparing the parties
ex ante welfare in the models with informed and uninformed intermediaries,
we conclude that the intermediary and the seller always gain from the more
precise information and thus improved e¢ ciency, while the impact on the
5Our paper is thus also related to a recent literature on signaling via the choice of
mechanism. See, in particular, papers by Cai et al. (2007), Jullien and Mariotti (2006).
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buyer depends on the nature of the intermediarys signal.
Most proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Double-Auction Mechanism with an
Intermediary
2.1 The Model
We consider a simple model of bilateral trade in the presence of an inter-
mediary. As in a standard model (e.g. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)),
there is a seller who can produce a unit of good at cost vS, and a buyer who
contemplates buying it and has valuation vB: It is common knowledge that
the agentsvaluations vS and vB are drawn independently from a uniform
distribution on [0; 1], but the valuations themselves are the agentsprivate
information. There is also an intermediary (or a broker) who has no valua-
tion for the good and only implements a transaction between the buyer and
the seller. All the parties are risk-neutral and their utility in the absence of
trade is normalized to 0.
We model the bargaining game between the buyer and the seller as a
double auction (see, e.g. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)), and assume
that the intermediary charges the traders a commission   0 which can
depend only on the fact of trade.6 Since the parties are risk-neutral and
care only about expected payments, we can assume (without loss)7 that the
intermediary charges a fee =2 from each trader if trade happens and nothing
otherwise. The (modied) double auction game proceeds as follows. The
6In reality, e.g. for real estate or art brokers, the intermediarys fee usually depends
on the trading price; often, it is a certain percent of the price. However, the simple
mechanism, to which we restrict attention for tractability reasons, allows to illustrate a
number of interesting e¤ects which would be also observed in a more general setting.
7It can be easily shown that the divivsion of the transaction fee between the buyer and
the seller is irrelevant, i.e. the market is not two-sided (see Rochet and Tirole (2004) for
an overview of two-sided markets).
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seller submits a bid pS and the buyer submits pB; trade occurs if pB  pS+ 
at price p = pB+pS
2
: Taking into account the intermediarys commission, the
seller gets pS =
pB+pS 
2
and the buyer pays pB =
pB+pS+
2
:
An important feature of the model that distinguishes it from the standard
bilateral trade setting is that the intermediary is partially informed about
one traders valuation and can communicate this information to the unin-
formed party thus a¤ecting her bargaining strategy. More specically, we
assume that the broker learns whether the buyer is eageror not eager
to trade:8 vB 2 [w; 1] or vB 2 [0; w] for some xed value w 2 (0; 1). This
signal is exogenous, no truthtelling incentive constraints are to be satised
for the intermediary to get this information. There are several justications
that can be given for this assumption. One is that a professional interme-
diary has more experience than a seller in interpreting the buyers observ-
able characteristics or aspects of pre-play behavior, so his knowledge of the
buyers valuation is more precise. Another interpretation is that (for similar
reasons) the intermediary has better information about the demand for the
sellers good, or at least about the distribution of the types of buyers that
he can match with the seller.9
8We want to avoid confusion with Farrell and Gibbons (1989), who use keen and
not keenin a similar double auction setting (but without intermediary). In their model,
where participants of the double auction can exchange cheap talk messages prior to the
bargaining stage, the subsets of keenand not keentypes are determined endogenously
in such a way that the information on the players belonging to one of the subsets could
be credibly transmitted in pre-play cheap talk. In our model, the subsets of eagerand
not eagertypes are dened exogenously.
9This interpretation seems appropriate in many situations. For example, an art dealer
may know better the demand for a particular piece of art than an accidental owner.
Similar argument often applies to other types of intermediaries, such as real estate agents,
recruiting agencies, etc.
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2.2 The Piecewise-Linear Equilibrium
Let us characterize the tradersbehavior at the bargaining stage. There are
many equilibria in the standard double auction game (see Leininger et al.
(1989))10, and this is of course true for our modied game as well. In this
paper, however, we shall restrict attention to equilibria in piecewise-linear
strategies, characterized in Lemma 1 below.11 In particular, we do not allow
for a direct pre-play communication between the parties as in Farrell and
Gibbons (1989) or Mathews and Postlewaite (1989).
Lemma 1 Assume it is common knowledge that the buyers and the sellers
valuations are independent and distributed uniformly on [vB; vB] and [vS; vS]
respectively. Let
~pS(vS) : =
2
3
vS +
1
4
vB +
1
12
vS  

4
; (1)
~pB(vB) : =
2
3
vB +
1
12
vB +
1
4
vS +

4
: (2)
(i) Assume ~pB(vB) < ~pS(vS) + : Then at the bargaining stage there exists
an equilibrium in piecewise-linear strategies in which
pS(vS) = maxf~pS(vS); ~pB(vB)  g; (3)
pB(vB) = minf~pB(vB); ~pS(vS) + g: (4)
Moreover, sets fvS j pS(vS) = ~pS(vS)g and fvB j pB(vB) = ~pB(vB)g
have positive measure.
(ii) Assume ~pB(vB)  ~pS(vS) + : Then at the bargaining stage there exists
an equilibrium in which pS(vS) = (vB + vS   )=2;and pB(vB) = (vB +
vS + )=2:
10Even more equilibria exist if the parties are allowed to engage in cheap talk before
submitting the bids (see Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and Mathews and Postlewaite (1989)).
11Lemma 1 extends to the case of trade with a broker the results of Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983), where the equilibrium in quasi-linear strategies is derived for the stan-
dard double-auction game with uniformly distributed valuations.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Condition ~pB(vB) < ~pS(vS)+ from the rst part of Lemma 1 means that
not all types of both parties are sure to trade if they are playing strategies
dened in (1)-(2). If this condition is satised, there exists an equilibrium in
piecewise-linear strategies: those types of seller that trade with probability
less than 1 in equilibrium (i.e. vS  v^S for some threshold v^S) use (1),
while those that are sure to trade submit the maximum bid that makes trade
happen for sure. The buyer behaves in a similar way. The parties trade in
this equilibrium if and only if vB  vS + 14vB   14vS + 34:
When all types of both parties are sure to trade given strategies (1)-(2),
i.e. ~pB(vB)  ~pS(vS) + ; the specied piecewise-linear equilibrium breaks
down. Then, as the second part of the Lemma shows, there is an equilibrium
in which trade happens with probability 1 and the price is constant, p =
vS+vB
2
. This equilibrium seems the most natural one when the distributions
of the buyers and the sellers types are symmetric with respect to each other
(i.e. vS   vS = vB   vB).
3 Cheap Talk Communication
We assume in this section that the tari¤  is xed exogenously.12 To make
things interesting, we assume throughout the paper that w >  (otherwise,
the brokers private information would have no impact). The broker gets the
signal about the buyers eagerness to trade prior to the double-auction stage.
Before the bids are submitted, he can send a message m 2 M about the
buyers eagerness to trade to the seller. The message has no intrinsic cost 
it is cheap talk. We assume that the intermediarys message is secret, so the
buyers strategy depends on the message(s) that is expected to be sent in
equilibrium and does not change if the broker deviates from his equilibrium
12We do not solve for the optimal fee  in this section (which could be done in a
straightforward way). However, in Section 5 in a more general setting we derive the
optimal menu of two-part tari¤s.
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announcement strategy.13
For a cheap-talk message to have some credibility, the interests of those
who send it and of those who attend to it must not be too far apart. In
our setting the interests of the intermediary and the seller have an impor-
tant common element both want feasible trade to happen. However, the
seller faces a trade-o¤ between the probability of exchange and the prot
she expects from it, whereas the intermediary wants simply to maximize the
probability of trade. Thus, it is not a priori clear whether the intermediary
is able to communicate the information he observes to the seller.
We suppose that traders have an innitesimal cost of submitting a bid.
We do not model it explicitly, but assume that if the trader is indi¤erent
between submitting a bid or not (which can happen in equilibrium only if
the trader perceives the probability to perform a protable transaction to
be 0), she abstains from bidding.14 As we shall see, this abstention of the
discouraged types of seller from trade plays a crucial role in disciplining the
broker.
3.1 Fully revealing equilibria
We shall call an equilibrium fully revealing if the intermediary can credibly
communicate all his information to the seller, i.e. the sellers beliefs about
the buyers valuation induced by the intermediarys message coincide with
the intermediarys own beliefs. We now want to explore the existence of
fully revealing equilibria.15 Note that since the intermediarys information is
13In the case of public messages results are similar see footnote 16.
14This behavior would be rational even if there were a small probability that the bro-
ker makes mistakes in determining the buyers eagerness it su¢ ces to require that the
probability of mistakes be su¢ ciently small (for a given cost of submitting a bid).
15There are many equilibria in the game. For example, as in any cheap talk game, there
exists a babbling equilibrium in which the intermediary transmits a message uncorrelated
with his signal and the seller gives it no credibility. Thus, a babbling equilibrium at the
rst stage followed by some equilibrium of the double auction (with the intermediary)
without communication is an equilibrium of the whole game.
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Figure 1:
binary, a binary message space is su¢ cient to fully transmit the intermedi-
arys information. Since we are interested in the existence of fully revealing
equilibria, we shall assume without loss that there are just two messages,
M = feager,not eagerg.
Proposition 1 There exists a fully revealing equilibrium in which the inter-
mediary truthfully reports the buyers eagerness to trade to the seller, and the
traders follow quasi-linear bidding strategies specied in Lemma 1.
Proof. We only need to check that the intermediary has incentives to
tell the truth if the parties expect that he will do so.
If the buyer is not eager to trade, the intermediary can only lose from
lying this would induce the seller to increase the price from ~pnot eagerS (vS) =
2
3
vS +
1
4
w   
4
to ~peagerS (vS) =
2
3
vS +
1
4
  
4
; which would only reduce the
probability of trade.
If the buyer is eager to trade, lying induces the seller to reduce the price
from ~peagerS (vS) =
2
3
vS +
1
4
  
4
to ~pnot eagerS (vS) =
2
3
vS +
1
4
w   
4
when vS 
vS =
3
4
(w  ); but stop bidding when vS > vS , i.e. when there is no chance
to trade with the non-eager buyer.
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If the buyer is eager, vB  w; under truthtelling trade happens when vB 
vS+
1
4
+ 3
4
. If the intermediary lies, trade happens when vB  vS+ 38w  18+ 34
and vS  34(w   ): The second condition implies the rst, so the gain from
lying is represented by the area of ABC triangle equal to 1
32
(1 w)2, and the
loss by the area of CDE equal to 9
32
(1 w)2 (see Figure 1): the loss exceeds
the gain for any value of w 2 (0; 1).
The proof of Proposition 1 illustrates the intermediarys fundamental
trade-o¤ between a higher probability of participation of the seller and his
less aggressive pricing. When it is common knowledge that the buyer is not
eager to trade, the sellers with low valuation (vS < vS) charge a lower price
than in the equilibrium where the buyer is eager to trade. However, for
sellers with higher valuations (vS > vS) probability to trade with a "bad"
buyer is zero, so, they lose nothing if they abstain from bidding (abstention
would be a dominant strategy for them if the participation cost were modelled
explicitly). Since the intermediary is interested in maximizing the volume of
trade, he might seem to be tempted to deviate from the equilibrium behavior
and always report that the buyer is not eager to trade because such a message
makes the seller reduce the price when vS < vS. However, as Proposition 1
shows, the potential gain from such a deviation is more than o¤set by the
loss coming from the abstention of the sellers with vS > vS:
16
The mechanism that ensures credibility of the intermediarys advise is
di¤erent from the reputation-based mechanisms studied in the literature (e.g.
Biglaiser (1993), Dixit (2003)). While reputation-based models are inherently
dynamic, we show that the intermediarys credibility can be achieved in a
16If the messages are public, a fully revealing equilibrium also exists, where the traders
play the same equilibrium strategies as in the equilibrium with private messages described
in Proposition 1.
Once again, the broker can be only tempted to understate the buyers eagerness. Assume
that he does so. The di¤erence now is that the buyer can detect the brokers deviation
and thus he plays a best response to the sellers strategy ~pnot eagerS (vS) =
2
3vS +
1
4w   4 ;
which can be easily shown to be pB = 34w +
1
4: The probability of trade is the same as
after a deviation in the case of private messages, so the deviation is not protable.
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static context. This static nature makes our model related to an extensive
literature on expert advise, which largely elaborates on Crawford and Sobels
(1982) model.17 The main di¤erence is that we consider a specic cost of false
advice that an intermediary is facing the discouragement of his clients from
bargaining that is not studied in that literature.
3.2 Welfare
In our analysis of welfare implications of the intermediarys access to infor-
mation about the buyer we restrict ourselves to fully revealing equilibria in
which traders play piecewise-linear strategies from Lemma 1. The previ-
ous analysis shows that, when the principal possesses information about the
buyer that he then truthfully communicates to the seller, gains from trade
are realized on a larger set of valuations than in the case of an uninformed
intermediary. Hence, the intermediarys ability to observe and communi-
cate information increases the aggregate welfare. However, as the following
Proposition shows, it is not necessarily true that all participants gain from
the intermediarys being informed.
Proposition 2 (i) The intermediarys expected prot is higher if he is
able to observe the buyers predisposition to trade and communicate it
to the seller.
(ii) The seller with any valuation vS 2 [0; 1] either strictly gains from the
intermediarys ability to observe the buyers predisposition to trade and
communicate it or gets the same utility as with uninformed intermedi-
ary.
(iii) The buyer with valuation vB 2 [0; w] either strictly gains from the in-
termediarys ability to observe her predisposition to trade and commu-
nicate it or gets the same utility as with uninformed intermediary; the
17See, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a review.
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buyer with valuation vB 2 [w; 1] either strictly loses or gets the same
utility.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The fact that the intermediary gains from communicating his information
is quite intuitive: the probability of trade increases and the intermediarys
prot in our setup is proportional to it. It is also quite clear that the seller
should gain: she is able to adapt her bidding strategy bid less aggressively
if the buyer is known not to be eager to trade (vB 2 [0; w]), or, in contrast,
submit higher bids if the buyer is known to be interested in trade (vB 2
[0; w]), thus increasing the gains without compromising the probability of
trade. Finally, if the buyer is not eager to trade (vB 2 [0; w]), she gains from
the sellers learning this: the seller adapts her strategy and submits lower
bids. In contrast, if the buyer is eager to trade, she su¤ers from the sellers
learning this, since the seller starts submitting higher bids.
The following proposition evaluates the impact of the observability of
the buyers predisposition to trade on the ex ante welfare of the traders. A
direct consequence of Proposition 2 is that the seller unambiguously gains.
However, the buyers welfare can increase or decrease, depending on the
characteristics of the information structure.
Proposition 3 (i) If 7 
p
13
18
+ 11+
p
13
18
 < w < 7+
p
13
18
+ 11 
p
13
18
; the buyer
gains from the intermediarys ability to observe her predisposition to
trade and communicate it.
(ii) If w < 7 
p
13
18
+ 11+
p
13
18
 or w > 7+
p
13
18
+ 11 
p
13
18
 the buyer loses from
the intermediarys ability to observe her predisposition to trade and
communicate it.
Proof. See the Appendix.
16
3.3 Fine Information Structures
To check the robustness of the fully revealing communication, let us consider
an alternative information structure: assume now that the intermediary ob-
serves to which element [ i
n
; i+1
n
]; i 2 0; :::; n  1 of a uniform n element par-
tition of the unit interval belongs the buyers type. When n tends to innity,
the intermediarys information about the buyer becomes arbitrarily precise.
As the following proposition shows, the full revelation result continues to
hold in this setting for any n.18
Proposition 4 Assume that the intermediary observes to which interval
[ i
n
; i+1
n
]; i 2 0; :::; n   1 belongs the buyers type (n 2 N). Then there ex-
ists a fully revealing equilibrium in which the intermediary truthfully reports
the buyers eagerness to trade to the seller.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result is in sharp contrast with the standard intuition of cheap talk
communication models à la Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the sender
can communicate his information to the receiver only with some noise, the
amount of noise being increasing as the interests of the parties become more
diverged. In our model there is an additional complication: the sender (i.e.
the broker) is uncertain about the receivers (i.e. the sellers) reaction to his
announcement since he does not observe the sellers type. Despite an ap-
parent conict of interests (the seller is concerned with both the probability
of trade and the expected surplus in case of trade, whereas the broker cares
only about the probability of trade), the broker can communicate arbitrar-
ily ne information to the seller. The reason is that the brokers inability
to predict the sellers reaction prevents him from understating the buyers
valuation. As Section 4.1 shows, when the broker becomes better informed
18This result can be pushed even further: in the limit, when the broker knows with
certainty the buyers type, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in which the broker
reveals truthfully the buyers valuation, the buyer bids pB = 34vB +
1
4 and the seller bids
pS =
3
4 (vB   ) if vS < 34 (vB   ) and any bid above 34 (vB   ) otherwise.
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about the sellers own valuation and his ability to predict the sellers reaction
is thus improved, no fully revealing equilibrium can exist for some values of
parameters.19
4 Limits to the E¤ective Communication
4.1 Two-sided advise
We have seen in the previous section that when the intermediary gets a
signal about the demand for the sellers good, he can credibly transmit this
information to the seller and thus increase the e¢ ciency of trade. We now
explore what happens when the intermediary is able to observe signals about
the valuations of both participants. Is he still able to share this information
with the parties? We shall see that, in contrast to Proposition 1, the answer
depends now on the parameters of the problem.
Assume the intermediary observes two signals: the rst signal, as before,
reveals whether the buyer is eager to trade (vB 2 [w; 1]) or not (vB 2 [0; w]);
the second signal reveals whether the seller is eager to trade (vS 2 [0; 1 w]) or
not (vS 2 [1 w; 1]). In particular, we assume for simplicity that the signals
about both traders are symmetric with respect to each other and thus have
equal ex ante informativeness. As before, the intermediarys reports to the
parties are assumed to be secret.
Proposition 5 A fully revealing equilibrium, in which the intermediary truth-
fully reports each traders eagerness to her counterpart and the traders follow
quasi-linear bidding strategies specied in Lemma 1. exists if and only if
w  3
p
2 2
4
+ 3(2 
p
2)
4
 or w  5
8
+ 3
8
:
19The idea that the receivers private information can guarantee e¤ective cheap-talk
communication even in a situation of sharp conict of interests dates back to Seidmann
(1990). The receivers possession of private information may have important implications
in more general signaling models. For example, Feltovich et al. (2002) show that it can
lead to "countersignaling", that is, the senders action becoming non-monotonic in his
type.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 5 shows that when both traders are eager to
trade truthtelling constraints may not be satised under some parameters.
More precisely, when w  5
8
+ 3
8
, the parties are sure to trade when it is
common knowledge that both are eager, so the intermediary has no interest
in falsifying this information. When w  3
p
2 2
4
+ 3(2 
p
2)
4
; falsication of
the report is too costly for the intermediary too many types who have no
chance to trade with non-eager partner refuse to trade after getting a false
pessimistic report. In the intermediate case, however, truthtelling cannot be
induced.
Corollary 1 Assume that the intermediary observes the type of both parties
but gives advise to only one of them (say, the seller). Then, truthtelling can
be induced only if w  3
p
2 2
4
+ 3(2 
p
2)
4
 or w  5
8
+ 3
8
:
Proof. Assume that 3
p
2 2
4
+ 3(2 
p
2)
4
  w  5
8
+ 3
8
 and both traders
are eager to trade. If truthtelling equilibrium did exist, then the players
would follow the same strategies as in the case of two-sided advice covered in
Proposition 5 (when the buyer knows that the seller is eager plays the same
strategy as when she is uninformed about the sellers type  see Lemma
1 for the specication of equilibrium strategies). Then, the intermediaries
incentives to mislead the seller would be the same as in the case of two-sided
advice. Hence, as the proof of Proposition 5 shows, he would like to lie to
the seller breaking the truthtelling equilibrium.
Corollary 1 once again emphasizes that even with one-sided advice, the
intermediary must not be too well informed about the advisee in order to
have incentives for truthful revelation of information: his ability to predict
the sellers reaction tempts him to understate the buyers eagerness to trade.
4.2 Competition between Intermediaries
In this section we consider a simple model of competition between intermedi-
aries. Assume there are two intermediaries, I1 and I2, and each intermediary
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has one (captured) buyer, Bi; i = 1; 2, ready to perform a transaction via
the intermediary. The buyersvaluations vBi ; i = 1; 2; are independent and
uniformly distributed on [0; 1]: There is one seller (with valuation vS, uni-
formly distributed on [0; 1]) and intermediaries compete for this seller. Once
the seller chooses the intermediary, e.g. I1, the game proceeds as described
in Section 2: the seller and the buyer B1 play a double auction game and
transaction happens if the bid/ask spread exceeds the per transaction price
charged by the intermediary, 1.
As before, we assume that each intermediary observes whether his buyer
is eager to trade or not, vBi 2 [w; 1] or [0; w]. This signal is the intermedi-
arys private information, neither the seller nor the competing intermediary
have any information about the intermediarys captured buyer (except prior
distribution of her types). Before the seller makes her choice, each interme-
diary announces to the seller whether his buyer is eager to trade or not; these
announcements are made simultaneously. Importantly, we assume that these
announcements are the only means of competition between the intermedi-
aries: per transaction prices 1; 2 are assumed to be exogenously xed at
some level : While this assumption is not very realistic, it greatly simplies
the analysis and still allows to illustrate important trade-o¤s the intermedi-
aries are facing. Prices for intermediariesservices may be sticky since it may
be too costly to adjust them for each transaction. This argument justies the
assumption that prices are xed for each given transaction and do not depend
on the willingness to pay of the particular buyer. Moreover, the assumption
that they are equal, 1 = 2; can be explained by competition between ex
ante identical intermediaries (formal modeling of this price competition is
beyond the scope of this paper).
Let us check under which conditions there is a fully revealing equilibrium
in this game, in which the intermediaries report truthfully and the traders
play piecewise-linear strategies from Lemma 1 at the bargaining stage. We
assume that if the seller obtains the same messages from two intermediaries,
she chooses each of them with equal probability. If one of the buyers is eager,
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and the other is not, then it is in the interests of the seller to choose the eager
buyer.
Proposition 6 Fully revealing equilibrium exists in a model with competing
intermediaries if and only if w 2 [0; w()] for some threshold w():
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the proof we show that an intermediary may be only tempted to over-
state his buyers willingness to trade in order to attract the seller: the in-
centive constraint preventing understatement of the buyers willingness to
trade is never binding. This is in sharp contrast to the case of monopolistic
intermediary, who cannot gain from overstatement of the buyers eagerness
to trade but may be tempted to understate it in order to soften the sellers
bidding strategy.
Given that only "no overstatement" constraint may be binding, the results
of Proposition 6 are quite intuitive. Indeed, when w is small, an intermediary
will not want to attract the seller by overstating his buyers willingness to
trade since the probability of trade of a non-eager buyer with overoptimistic
seller is too low in this case.
5 Signaling via Two-Part Tari¤s
In this section we endogenize the intermediarys choice of contract. We as-
sume that the intermediary charges the traders two-part tari¤s consisting of
xed fees for participation (B for the buyer and S for the seller) and a
commission which can depend only on the fact of trade, .20 Since the par-
ties are risk-neutral and care only about expected payments, we can assume
without loss that the intermediary charges a fee =2 from each trader if trade
20We will show that in our setting an appropriately chosen menu of two-part tari¤s allows
the broker to obtain the same prot as he would get in the optimal complete mechanism,
so there is no loss in restructing attention to this class of mechanisms (of course, this claim
need not be true under more general assumptions).
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happens and nothing otherwise21.
5.1 The Optimal Direct Mechanism
In the absence of information observed by the broker, Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) have characterized a direct mechanism maximizing the brokers
ex ante prot. They have shown that it is optimal for the broker to implement
trade if and only if the buyers virtual valuation (i.e. his true valuation
minus the information rent required to induce truthtelling) exceeds that of
the seller, which for the case of uniform distributions on [0; 1] means that
vB  vS + 12 ; and to leave no surplus to the worst buyer (vB = 0) and to the
worst seller (vS = 1).22
The broker can use the informative signal he gets in designing the op-
timal mechanism. For example, as Mylovanov (2005) shows, in quasi-linear
environments with independent private valuations the informed principal im-
plements an ex ante optimal allocation.23 Skreta (2007) shows a similar result
in the context of an informed seller problem, where the sellers private infor-
mation is correlated with the buyersvaluations: he shows that the optimal
mechanism gives the seller the same expected surplus as he would get af-
ter full disclosure of his private information. A similar result obtains in our
model. Indeed, by the inscrutability principle,24 the upper bound of the
brokers expected prot can be found through the optimal direct truthful
mechanism, which species the probability of trade and the expected pay-
ments from the buyer to the broker and from the broker to the seller as
21We assume that the brokers commission is divided equally between the parties, but
it can be easily shown that the divivsion of the transaction fee between the buyer and the
seller is irrelevant, i.e. the market is not two-sided (see Rochet and Tirole (2004) for an
overview of two-sided markets).
22These conditions uniquely determine the expected transfers from the buyer to the
broker and from the broker to the seller.
23A similar result in somewhat more restrictive context was obtained in Maskin and
Tirole (1990) and (1992).
24Inscrutability principle is a generalization of the revelation principle to the informed
principal setting see Myerson (1983).
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functions of the three partiesreports, subject to the incentive compatibility
and interim participation constraints. The optimal mechanism25 is described
in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 The mechanism maximizing the brokers ex ante prot im-
plements trade if vB  vS + 12 when the buyer is eager (vB 2 [w; 1]) and
if vB  vS + w2 when the buyer is not eager (vB 2 [0; w]). The buyer with
valuation vB = 0 or vB = w gets no ex ante surplus, as well as the seller
with valuation vS = 1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that the broker obtains the same expected prot as
he would get if he shared his signal about the buyers valuation with the
seller and then used an optimal direct mechanism to which only the buyer
and the seller would report their valuations. Note that in our setting where
the brokers own announcement can be veried ex post (assuming that the
buyer truthfully reveals his type), it is costless for the broker to induce his
own truthtelling once the buyers truthtelling is secured.
5.2 Optimal Two-Part Tari¤s
We shall show now that by choosing an appropriate menu of two-part tari¤s
the intermediary can achieve the same prot as in the optimal direct mecha-
nism. We assume the following timing. First, the broker species a set T of
two-part tari¤s (B; S; ). Then, the traders observe their private valuations
and the broker learns whether vB 2 [0; w] or vB 2 [w; 1]: The broker pub-
licly announces a two-part tari¤ from the set T .26 Next, the parties choose
25The mechanism is uniquely dened by the probability of trade and the expected utility
of the buyers and the sellers with valuations vB = 1, vB = w and vS = 0. Transfer
functions can be specied in multiple ways, but the expected payment of each type of
agent is the same (see Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
26We assume that the broker species the menue of tari¤s, T , prior to observing any
information mainly for tractability reasons: this assumption allows to avoid the analysis
of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that would be necessary if the broker o¤ered an "unexpected"
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whether they want to participate in the double auction and if they choose to
participate, they pay the participation fees and submit their bids. Finally,
if the bids pS and pB are submitted and the spread pB   pS exceeds , the
broker implements a transaction at price p = pB+pS
2
. We keep assuming
that traders have an innitesimal cost of submitting a bid, and that at the
double auction stage they play quasi-linear equilibrium strategies specied
in Lemma 1.
As the following Proposition shows, the intermediary can achieve the
highest prot characterized in Proposition 7 through an appropriately chosen
system of two-part tari¤s.
Proposition 8 There exists a menu of two-part tari¤s T = f(EB; ES ; E);
(NEB ; 
NE
S ; 
NE)g which gives the broker the same expected prot as the op-
timal direct mechanism.
 When the buyer is eager (vB 2 [w; 1]), the optimal tari¤ is E = 13 ;
ES = 0;
EB =
(
1
3
(w   1
2
)2 if w > 1
2
;
0 if w  1
2
:
 When the buyer is not eager (vB 2 [0; w]), the optimal tari¤ is NE = w3 ;
NES = 0; 
NE
B = 0:
Proof. Assume that the broker sets T = f(EB; ES ; E); (NEB ; NES ; NE)g;
where the two tari¤s are as specied in the Proposition. We need to show
that the brokers choice of tari¤ once he observes the signal is incentive com-
patible and that these tari¤s lead to the same expected prot as the optimal
direct mechanism. Then, the choice of T is an optimal one.
A) Assume that the buyer is eager, vB 2 [w; 1] and that w  12 . If the
broker chooses (EB; 
E
S ; 
E); the seller infers that the buyer is eager (and it is
common knowledge between the traders), and trade happens i¤ vB  vS + 12
(EDF triangle on Figure 1). The probability of trade conditional on the
tari¤.
24
vS
vB
2
1
A B
CD E
2
w
w
F
1
10
Figure 2:
buyer being eager is SEDF
1 w =
1
8(1 w) : Thus, the brokers expected revenue is
ER = 1
24(1 w) :
Assume that the intermediary deviates and chooses (NEB ; 
NE
S ; 
NE): The
seller then infers that the buyer is not eager (and this is again common
knowledge between the traders), and trade happens i¤ vS  w2 (ABCD
rectangle on Figure 2): the sellers strategy is to bid pS(vS) = 23vS +
w
6
if he
believes there is a positive probability of trade and to abstain from bidding
otherwise. The seller expects the buyer to bid p^B(vB) = 23vB +
w
6
and thus
no trade to happen i¤ vS > w2 ; so only sellers with vS  w2 submit bids.
The buyers best response to this strategy is to bid ~pB(vB) = 5w6 ; so that all
traders who submit bids trade with certainty. The brokers expected revenue
in case of deviation isgER = w2
6
which can be easily checked to be lower than
1
24(1 w) for any w 2 [0; 12 ]:
B) Assume that the buyer is eager, vB 2 [w; 1] and that w > 12 . If the
broker chooses (EB; 
E
S ; 
E); the seller infers that the buyer is eager (and it is
common knowledge between the traders), and trade happens i¤ vB  vS+ 12 .
Thus, the brokers expected revenue is ER = EB + 
E
S + 
E PrfTradeg =
25
1
3
(w   1
2
)2 + w
2
6
:
If the broker deviates and chooses (NEB ; 
NE
S ; 
NE); the seller infers that
the buyer is not eager, trade happens i¤ vS  w2 (the same reasoning as in
the previous case) resulting in the brokers expected revenuegER = w2
6
which
is lower than ER:
C) Assume that the buyer is not eager, vB 2 [0; w]; and that w  12 . If
the intermediary chooses (NEB ; 
NE
S ; 
NE); the seller infers that the buyer is
not eager, and trade happens i¤ vB  vS + w2 . Thus, the brokers expected
revenue is ER = w
2
24
: If he deviates and elects (EB; 
E
S ; 
E), there is no trade
andgER = 0:
D) Assume that the buyer is not eager, vB 2 [0; w]; and that w > 12 . If the
intermediary chooses (NEB ; 
NE
S ; 
NE); again trade happens i¤ vB  vS + w2
and the intermediarys expected revenue is ER = w
2
24
: If he deviates and
elects (EB; 
E
S ; 
E), there is trade i¤ vB  vS + 12 and vB  vB; where vB is
the type of buyer for whom the expected gain from trade is just su¢ cient to
compensate her for the fee EB :
UB(v

B) =
1
2
(vB  
1
2
)2   1
3
(w   1
2
)2 = 0:
Thus gER = 1
18w
(w   1
2
)2 +
1
3w
(1 
r
2
3
)(w   1
2
)3;
which can be shown to be smaller than ER for all w 2 [1
2
; 1]:
The sellers expected return can be easily checked to be the same as in
the optimal direct mechanism.
5.3 Welfare
It is natural that the intermediary gains from learning a signal about the
buyers valuation. Looking at how the optimal mechanism takes this infor-
mation into account one should expect that the seller also gains: the inter-
mediary charges a lower fee when the buyer is not eager and trade happens
more often. As for the buyer, the impact of the loss of privacy on her welfare
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is ambiguous: on the one hand, when the intermediary learns that the buyer
is not eager to trade, he charges a lower transaction fee than he would in
the absence of the knowledge on the buyers predisposition to trade (on top
of direct benet this also makes the sellers bidding less aggressive). On the
other hand, the buyer pays a participation fee if she is discovered to be eager
to trade, the fee she does not pay if the intermediary is completely agnos-
tic about her willingness to trade. Besides, as in the cheap-talk setting, the
seller bids more aggressively. As Proposition 9 shows, which e¤ect dominates
is determined by the quality of information: if the signal that the buyer is
eageris relatively weak (i.e. w is not too high), the rst e¤ect dominates
and the buyer benets from the ner information together with the other
players; if the signal that the buyer is eageris relatively strong (w is high
enough), the second e¤ect dominates and the buyer loses.
Proposition 9 (i) The observability of the buyers predisposition increases
the probability of trade; the ex ante welfare of the seller and of the bro-
ker is higher than in the benchmark no-signal case.
(ii) There exists w 2  1
2
; 1

such that the buyer gains from her predisposi-
tion being discovered and communicated if w < w and loses if w > w.
6 Conclusions
Our analysis shows that the intermediary can credibly transmit the infor-
mation he possesses about one of the bargaining parties (the buyer) to the
other (the seller). The mechanism ensuring credibility is di¤erent from tra-
ditional reputation-based mechanisms: rather, it relies on a trade-o¤ the
intermediary is facing between "softer" bargaining by the advisee and her
willingness to participate in the bargaining at all. More precisely, although
the intermediary is tempted to understate the buyers willingness to trade
and thus encourage the seller to reduce price, he prefers not to do so since
the withdrawal of the pessimistic sellers from the bargaining process after
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such a report outweighs the gains from price reduction by those sellers that
keep trading. An important element of our analysis is two-sided asymmet-
ric information: the intermediary does not know the willingness to trade
of the advisee (the seller) and thus cannot predict her reaction to a report
about the willingness to trade of the buyer. We reveal two factors that can
undermine the credibility of the intermediarys advice. First, his ability to
better predict the reaction of the seller in the case when the intermediary
has information about both parties may undermine incentives for truthful
information revelation. Second, when intermediaries (endowed with "cap-
tured" buyers) compete for attracting the seller, they may be tempted to
overstate their buyers willingness to trade in order to attract the seller even
at a cost of more aggressive pricing on the part of the seller. Finally, con-
cerns about losses that some consumers may incur from the lack of privacy
vis-à-vis an intermediary (as in the case of real estate services provided by a
consumers bank) are shown to be justied: although the aggregate welfare
increases when an intermediary becomes partially informed, some consumers
(the buyers in our model) may get worse o¤.
In future work we would like to examine competition between interme-
diaries in more detail. For another interesting extension, assume that the
sellers can either apply to an intermediary to be matched with a buyer or go
directly to the search market (as in Gehrig (1993)), and the only di¤erence
is that the intermediary can give them some useful information about the
buyer (like in our model). Then, what types of sellers will choose to trade
through the intermediary? If the buyers also have choice, what buyers will
choose to be matched through the intermediary?
It is also important to investigate the intermediarys incentives to collect
information. In our analysis we have assumed that the intermediary always
gets an exogenous signal, but in some circumstances it may be more natural
to presume that the intermediary has to exert e¤ort to get a signal.
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7 Appendix
The Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Assume the seller plays the specied strategy.
Since ~pS(vS) is increasing, it means that 9v^S 2 [vS; vS] such that pS(vS) =
~pS(vS) if vS  v^S and pS(vS) = ~pB(vB)   otherwise. Assumption ~pB(vB) <
~pS(vS)+ guarantees that v^S < vS. Then, the buyer with valuation vB solves
max
pB

vB   E[~pS(vS) j ~pS(vS)  pB   ; vS  v^S] + pB + 
2

 Prf~pS(vS)  pB   ; vS  v^Sg
+

vB   ~pB(vB)   + pB + 
2

Prf~pB(vB)  pB; vS < v^Sg:
Taking rst-order condition we get, after some simplications, pB(vB) =
~pB(vB) unless ~pB(vB) > ~pS(vS)+ in which case Prf~pS(vS)  ~pB(vB) ; vS 
v^Sg = 1: In the latter case it is optimal to set pB(vB) = ~pS(vS) +  (i.e. the
minimal pB such that Prf~pS(vS)  pB   ; vS  v^Sg = 1).
Again, since ~pB(vB) is increasing, there exists v^B such that the buyer plays
pB(vB) = ~pB(vB) for vB  v^B and pB(vB) = ~pS(vS)+ otherwise; assumption
~pB(vB) < ~pS(vS) +  guarantees that v^B > vB. Similar reasoning shows
optimality of the piecewise-linear sellers strategy specied in the Lemma if
the buyer plays the indicated equilibrium strategy.
(ii) Given that the seller plays pS(vS) = (vB+vS )=2 it is indeed optimal
for the buyer to play pB(vB) = (vB+vS+)=2 provided that vB  (vB+vS+
)=2: Assumption ~pB(vB)  ~pS(vS)   guarantees that vB  (vB + vS + )=2
is indeed veried for all values vB 2 [vB; vB]:
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider rst the benchmark case where the
intermediary has no access to information about the buyer. Given equilib-
rium strategies, specied in Lemma 1, one easily nds the expected utilities
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of the parties:
UB(vB) =
(
1
2
(vB   34   14)2 if vB > 14 + 34;
0 if vB  14 + 34;
US(vS) =
(
1
2
(3
4
(1  )  vS)2 if vS < 34(1  );
0 if vS  34(1  );
UI =
9(1  )2
32
:
Assume now that the intermediary learns the buyers predisposition to
trade and fully revealing equilibrium is played.
Consider, rst, the case when the buyer is not eager to trade, vB 2 [0; w]:
The probability of trade now is Prftrade j NEg = 9(w )2
32w
; so the inter-
mediarys expected prot is UNEI =
9(w )2
32w
: The tradersexpected utility
now is
UNEB (vB) =
(
1
2
(vB   34   14w)2 if vB > 14w + 34;
0 if vB  14w + 34;
UNES (vS) =
(
1
2w
(3
4
(w   )  vS)2 if vS < 34(w   );
0 if vS  34(w   );
Consider now the other case, when the buyer is eager, vB 2 [w; 1]: Assume
rst that w  1
4
+ 3
4
: Then the probability of trade is Prftrade j Eg = 9(1 )2
32(1 w)
and the partiesexpected payo¤s are
UEB (vB) =
(
1
2
(vB   34   14)2 if vB > 14 + 34;
0 if vB  14 + 34;
UES (vS) =
(
1
2
(3
4
(1  )  vS)2 11 w if vS < 34(1  );
0 if vS  34(1  );
UEI =
9(1  )2
32(1  w) :
Otherwise, if w > 1
4
+ 3
4
; the probability of trade is Prftrade j Eg =
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1
2
w + 1
4
  3
4
;and the partiesexpected payo¤s are
UEB (vB) =
8>><>>:
2
3
(vB   34   14)2   16(vB   w)2 if vB > 14 + 34;
+1
3
(vB   34   14)(34 + 14   w)
0 if vB  14 + 34;
UES (vS) =
8>><>>:
(1
2
w + 1
4
  3
4
   vS) if vS < w   14   34;
1
2(1 w)(
3
4
(1  )  vS)2 if w   14   34  vS < 34(1  );
0 if vS  34(1  );
UEI = (
1
2
w +
1
4
  3
4
):
Note, rst, that the expected probability of trade with informed interme-
diary, Prftrade j Eg(1 w)+Prftrade j NEgw; is greater than the expected
probability of trade with the uninformed one, 9(1 )
2
32
; which proves that the
intermediary gets better o¤ from access to the signal about the buyer.
The result concerning the seller follows from comparison of UES (vS)(1  
w) + UNES (vS)w with US(vS): In fact, it follows that sellers with valuations
vS < v
0
S strictly gain, while sellers with valuations vS  v0S are indi¤erent,
where v0S =
3
4
(w   ):
Finally, the result concerning the buyer follows from comparing UEB (vB)
with UB(vB) if vB > w and comparing UNEB (vB) with UB(vB) if vB < w.
It follows that buyers that are not eager (vB < w) to trade strictly gain if
1
4
w+ 3
4
 < vB < w and are indi¤erent if vB  14w+ 34: As for the buyers who
are eager (vB > w), they all strictly lose if w > 14 +
3
4
 and are indi¤erent
otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i) follows immediately from Propo-
sition 2. For parts (ii) and (iii), note that in the benchmark case, when
the intermediary is not able to observe the buyers predisposition to trade,
the buyers ex ante expected utility is EUB = 9128(1   )3 (it is derived by
taking expectation of UB(vB) from the proof of Proposition 2). When the
intermediary is informed, the buyers expected utility is
EU infB =
9
128
(w   )3 + (1  w)(1
8
w   1
4
   1
8
w +
3
16
2 +
1
16
):
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After simplications one gets that the buyer does not gain from the inter-
mediarys ability to observe her predisposition to trade, EUB   EU infB  0;
if and only if
9w2   (7 + 11)w + 1 + 5 + 32  0:
The latter inequality is satised if w < 7 
p
13
18
+ 11+
p
13
18
 or w > 7+
p
13
18
+
11 p13
18
:
Proof of Proposition 4.
Assume vB 2 [ in ; i+1n ]: Then, trade happens if vB  vS + i+14n + 34; so that
sellers with valuations vS  v^(i)S = i+1n   ( i+14n + 34) = 34( i+1n   ) participate
in the bargaining. Assume the intermediary reports truthfully the buyers
eagerness, i.e. sends message i if vB 2 [ in ; i+1n ]:
First, note the intermediary cannot gain from overstating the buyers ea-
gerness. Indeed, if the intermediary deviates and reports j > i; each type
of seller submits a higher bid (see equilibrium strategies in Lemma 1) thus
reducing the probability of trade. There is a second e¤ect, potentially posi-
tive: some types of seller that abstained from bargaining under truthtelling,
start participating if the buyers eagerness is overstated. However, since the
sellers strategy is increasing in her type, none of these types of seller actu-
ally trades with a positive probability, so the e¤ect of overstating the buyers
eagerness is unambiguously negative for the intermediary.
Assume now that the intermediary understates the buyers eagerness to
trade and reports j < i. It is easy to see from the specication of equilibrium
strategies in Lemma 1 that trade happens if vB  vS+ 14n+ 18n(3j i)+ 34 and
vS  v^(j)S = 34( j+1n   ) (the latter condition ensures that seller of type vS
nds it worthwhile to participate in bargaining). It is easy to check that the
second inequality implies the rst.
A positive gain from downward deviation can occur only if v^(j)S >
3
4
( i
n
 
)  1
4n
: the right-hand side of this inequality gives the value of vS for which
the probability of trade equals 1 under truthtelling; if this condition is not
satised, downward deviation brings no gain from less aggressive pricing
but only losses from reduces participation. This inequality, when simplied,
32
reduces to j+1 i >  1
3
; which implies that j = i 1 is a necessary condition
for a downward deviation to be protable.
Like in the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to check that the deviation
to j = i  1 brings gain from less aggressive bidding that is equal to 1
32
and
a loss from reduced participation equal to 9
32
; so it is clearly unprotable.
Proof of Proposition 5. To prove the ifpart, we, as in Proposition
1, only need to check that the intermediary wants to say the truth if he
expects the parties to believe his messages. It is clear that the intermediary
never wants to tell that a party is eager to trade if this is not true: it would
only decrease the probability of trade (this follows immediately from the
specication of equilibrium bidding strategies in Lemma 1).
Let us verify that the intermediary tells the truth if both parties are
eager to trade. Recall that the parties trade in this equilibrium if and only if
vB  vS + 14vB   14vS + 34: Substituting vB = w; vB = 1; vS = 1  w; vS = 0
into this inequality, we see that both parties are sure to trade if w  5
8
+ 3
8
.
According to Lemma 1, in this case they trade with probability 1 at price 1
2
;
and the intermediary has no incentive to lie.
Assume that 1
4
+ 3
4
  w  4
7
+ 3
7
 (i.e. w  1
4
+ 3
4
 and 1   w 
3
4
(w   )). Then, the situation is represented on Figure 3. The gain from
lying to the seller about the buyers type while telling the truth to the buyer
is the area of ABC triangle, while the loss is the area of CDEF trapezoid
(after a false report to the seller and a truthful report to the buyer trade
occurs when vS  vS = 34(w   ) all types of the seller that submit a
bid are sure to trade). Given that 1
4
+ 3
4
  w  4
7
+ 3
7
; the area of
ABC triangle does not exceed the area of CDEF trapezoid if and only
if w  3
p
2 2
4
+ 3(2 
p
2)
4
: When this inequality is not satised, truthtelling
cannot be induced if the parties play the strategies specied in Lemma 1 at
the double auction stage, so the fully revealing equilibrium does not exist.
Assume now that the intermediary lies to both traders. Then, the buyer
increases her bid but some buyers abstain from participation: trade happens
33
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Figure 3:
if vS  vS = 34(w   ) and vB  vB = 1   34(w   ): Now, if w  12 + 12;
the gain from lying is the area of triangle with the same vertex C, but the
horizontal edge now being given by vB = 1  34(w ) line instead of vB = w;
the loss is still given by CDEF trapezoid. Since 1  3
4
(w  )  w; the gain
is lower than from lying to just one party (e.g. the seller), while the loss is
the same. If 1
2
+ 1
2
  w  4
7
+ 3
7
; lying to both parties is unambiguously
unprotable (geometrically, the triangle, representing the gain, vanishes).
When 4
7
+ 3
7
  w  5
8
+ 3
8
; there is no cost of lying (to either one party
or both) and a positive gain: since vS =
3
4
(w  ) > 1 w; lying would result
in trade with probability one were the parties to believe the intermediarys
reports. A fully revealing equilibrium does not exist for this range of w.
Along similar lines it is easy to check that lying (to one or both parties)
is not benecial if w < 1
4
+ 3
4
:
When just one trader is eager to trade the analysis proceeds analogously
and shows that the intermediary never gains from lying in this case.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that an intermediary, say I1, faces
34
an eager buyer. If he reports this truthfully, the seller will choose him with
probability 1
2
(1   w) + w: Indeed, with probability w the other buyer, B2,
is not eager, so the seller chooses I1; with probability 1   w buyer B2 is
also eager, then I1 gets the seller with probability 1=2. The intermediarys
expected prot if she reports truthfully and gets the seller is
E[UEI1 j S chooses I1g =
(
9
32(1 w)(1  )2 if  < w  14 + 34;
1
4
(1  3 + 2w) if w > 1
4
+ 3
4
;
hence, the his expected utility from truthful reporting is
EUEI1 =
(
9(1+w)(1 )2
64(1 w) if  < w  14 + 34;
(1+w)(1 3+2w)
8
if w > 1
4
+ 3
4
:
Assume now that the intermediary deviates and reports that B1 is not
eager to trade. Then, the probability to attract the seller goes down to w
2
:
the seller chooses I1 (with probability 1=2) only if the other buyer is not
eager. The expected prot I1 gets conditionally on the seller choosing I1 is
E[ ~UEI1 j S chooses I1g =
3
4
(w   );
so
E ~UEI1 =
3
8
w(w   ):
It is easy to check that EUEI1 is always greater than E
~UEI1 , so an intermediary
never has an incentive to understate his buyers willingness to trade in a
competitive situation.
Assume now that B1 is not eager to trade. If the intermediary reports
the truth he attracts the seller with probability w=2 and his expected prot
is
EUNEI1 =
9(w   )2
64
:
If I1 overstates his buyers eagerness to trade, he gets the seller with a higher
probability, 1
2
(1 w)+w: However, the seller will compete more aggressively,
so the probability of trade conditional on attracting the seller is now lower,
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Figure 4:
9
128w
(3w   1   2)2 if w > 1
3
+ 2
3
 and 0 otherwise. The expected prot in
case of deviation is
E ~UNEI1 =
(
9(1+w)(3w 1 2)2
256w
w > 1
3
+ 2
3
;
0 if  < w  1
3
+ 2
3
:
Hence, truthtelling is optimal if w  1
3
+ 2
3
: Otherwise, truthtelling
constraint is equivalent to a polynomial inequality (cubic in w):
5w3 + 3w2   4w2   5w   8w + 1 + 4 + 42  0: (5)
Analytical solution of this inequality is too cumbersome; Figure 4 gives a plot
of polynomial (5) in blue color; it also represents a plot of plane w  (1
3
+ 2
3
)
in green and a plot of zero-level surface in yellow.
The gure shows that truthtelling constraint is satised if w 2 [1
3
+
2
3
; w()] and not satised if w 2 [ w(); 1] for some threshold w():
Proof of Proposition 7. Along the lines of Myerson and Satterthwaite
36
(1983) one easily shows that the brokers expected prot
UI = w
1Z
0
wZ
0
[(vB   1  F
L
B (vB)
fLB(vB)
)
 (vS + FS(vS)
fS(vS)
)]pL(vS; vB)f
L
B(vB)fS(vS)dvBdvS
+(1  w)
1Z
0
1Z
w
[(vB   1  F
H
B (vB)
fHB (vB)
)
 (vS + FS(vS)
fS(vS)
)pH(vS; vB)]f
H
B (vB)fS(vS)dvBdvS
 wUB(0)  (1  w)UB(w)  US(1);
where FLB (vB) =
vB
w
and FHB (vB) =
vB w
1 w for our case of uniform distributions,
pL(vS; vB) and pH(vS; vB) are the probabilities of trade for the case of a non-
eager and eager buyer. It is optimal to set
pL(vS; vB) =
(
1 if vB  vS + w2 ;
0 otherwise
;
pH(vS; vB) =
(
1 if vB  vS + 12 ;
0 otherwise
and UB(0) = UB(w) = US(1) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 9. One can check that under the optimal two-
part tari¤ the ex ante expected utility of the buyer, the seller and the broker
in the absence of information about the buyers eagerness to trade is the
following:
U0B = U
0
S =
32
27
(1  )3 = 1
48
;
U0I =
32(1  )2
25
=
1
24
:
When the buyer is discovered to be not eager to trade the expected utilities
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are:
UNEB =
32(w   )3
27w
=
w2
48
;
UNES =
32(w   )3
27w
=
w2
48
UNEI =
32(w   )2
25w
=
w2
24
:
If the buyer is eager and w < 1
2
UEB = U
E
S =
32(1  )3
27(1  w) =
1
48(1  w) ;
UEI =
32(1  )2
25(1  w) =
1
24(1  w) :
If the buyer is eager and w  1
2
UEB =
1
1  w (
3
32
(1  )3   1
18
(w   1
4
  3
4
)3
  1
18
(1  w)3   3
32
(1  )2(w   1
4
  3
4
)  1
3
(w   1
2
)2)
=
w
12
  1
3
(w   1
2
)2;
UES =
1
6
(1  w)2 + 1
4
(w   1
2
);
UEI =
w
6
:
Thus, when the intermediary observes the buyers eagerness to trade, the
ex ante expected utilities for the case w < 1
2
are
UB = US =
1
48
+
1
48
w3;
UI =
1
24
+
1
24
w3
and for the case w  1
2
they are
UB =
w(1  w)
12
+
1
48
w3   1
3
(w   1
2
)2;
US =
1
24
  w
8
+
w2
4
  7w
3
48
;
UI =
w(1  w)
6
+
w3
24
:
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It is easy to check that US > U0S and UI > U
0
I for all w and UB > U
0
B for
w < w; while UB < U0B for w > w; where w is a root of
5
12
w  5
12
w2+ 1
48
w3 
5
48
= 0; w  0:61:
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